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But because she has discovered the advantages of being herself, the protagonist 
refuses any resolution that does not agree with the ich which she has just discovered. 
Alone with herself again, the protagonist decides to distinguish between possibilities 
and necessities and to accept nothing unless it proves to be necessary for her inner 
ich. 
These two novels show quite clearly that the East-German writer has freed 
himself from the stringent literary and political "guidelines" which seemed imposed 
on him by the tradition of socialist realism of the last few decades, and that he 
realizes that other styles and approaches for depicting reality do exist, that there are 
other—perhaps inner—worlds besides that of the working class. It is obvious that 
the East Germans are now convinced that exchanging ideas with—perhaps even 
taking a lesson from—authors of the capitalist world can be advantageous. 
These and similar literary experiments prove that the East-German writers 
have finally broken out of their isolation and have joined experimenting 
contemporaries in the West. It will be interesting to see how long it will take writers 
in other socialist countries to decide—or to be permitted—to participate in the 
search for new themes and unconventional forms which has been going on in the 
Western world for some time now. 
S. Elkhadem 
University of New Brunswick 
Nightwood and the Freudian Unconscious 
When Djuna Barnes's Nightwood first appeared in 1937 accompanied by a 
preface in which T. S. Eliot enthusiastically endorsed the work, only a few 
avant-garde critics seemed to feel that a major literary event had taken place. Since 
that time the novel has attracted a small circle of admirers who have been awed by 
Barnes's extraordinary ability to infuse macabre or grotesque subject matter with 
haunting beauty, but the general concensus seems to be, with a few notable 
exceptions, that an excessive lack of verisimilitude makes it something less than a 
masterpiece.' Nightwood has not yet been recognized as a truly great piece of 
American fiction simply because we have failed to fully appreciate the fact that it 
does not depict human interaction on the level of conscious, waking existence. It is 
rather a dream world in which the embattled forces of the human personality take 
die form of characters representing aspects ofthat personality at different levels of 
its functioning. 
The understanding of the structure of man's interior life revealed in the 
narrative is remarkably close to that advanced by Sigmund Freud only a few years 
before Barnes began work on the novel. In 1923 Freud chose to describe the 
distribution and interaction of the two instinctual forces which he had defined 
previously—Eros and Thanatos—in terms of three mental provinces. The 
provinces delineated in this model—ego, superego, and id—are not, Freud makes 
clear, autonomous entities which are completely disparate and distinct from one 
anotlier, but rather modes of mental activity which overlap and intermesh. Barnes's 
treatment of character seems quite consistent with Freud's conception of the nature 
of the three divisions in our mental life. She does not present us with allegorical 
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figures who take on "all" the characteristics of one mode of functioning, but rather 
with representatives of the interior workings of the human mind at different points 
along the continuum of psychic experience. 
Most of what occurs in Nightwood is in response to one character whose 
presence is so mysterious that it occasions endless fascination on the part of all who 
have contact with her. When Robin Vote first appears as a nameless American who 
has fainted in a Parisian hotel room, her eyes suggest "the long unqualified range in 
the iris of wild beasts who have not tamed the focus down to meet the human eye."2 
She possesses, says her abandoned husband, "an indefinable disorder, a sort of 
'odour of memory,' like a person who has come from a place we have forgotten and 
would give our life to recall" (p. 118). Demonstrating little inclination to indulge in 
abstract thinking and no real capacity to analyze the behavior of others, her every 
action is spontaneous and utterly unpredictable. 
The most striking feature of Robin's makeup is her unrestrained sexuality 
which finds expression in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships. Driven 
by a passion that knows neither limits or boundaries, every limb of her body seems 
to glow with a sexual energy that could encompass all living flesh without achieving 
respite from desire. Unable to maintain a commitment to any one sexual partner no 
matter what effort those partners make to maintain the relationship, she roams the 
dark world of Nightwood like a bitch in heat in incessant pursuit of yet another 
sexual experience. In the last scene of the novel, which is strangely beautiful in spite 
of the fact that the action described would be considered obscene by almost any 
standard, we find her engaged in sexual play with a dog—"crawling after him" on 
the floor and "barking in a fit of laughter" (p. 170). 
The parallels between Barnes's characterization of Robin and Freud's 
description of the dynamics of the interior life on the level of the id are simply too 
extensive to ignore. The id, which Freud associated with the more vestigial portion 
of the brain's anatomy, is the place where man's primitive instincts originate. It also 
functions as a kind of psychic energizer which compels the individual to take action. 
It is, says Freud, "a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement," and has "no 
organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the 
instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure principle."3 Analytical or logical 
thought cannot occcur in the id because the "laws of logic—above all, the law of 
contradiction—do not hold for processes in the id" (NL p. 104). The last.of the 
parallels hardly needs mentioning—sexual desire is the overt manifestation of an 
instinctual need which the id seeks uncompromisingly to gratify. 
Not long after her unexplained appearance in the hotel room in Paris, Robin 
accepts Baron Felik Volkbein's proposal of marriage without giving any thought 
whatsoever to the consequences of her action. The "Baron," who knows that the 
title was fabricated by his father, tries desperately to present himself as a member of 
the European aristocracy. He becomes obsessed with "what he termed 'Old 
Europe': aristocracy, nobility, royalty," and spends much of his time searching for 
the "correct thing to which to pay tribute: the right street, the right cafe, the right 
building, the right vista" (p. 9). His every gesture is governed by his conception of 
place and function in society, and his whole demeanor is that of a remarkably 
constrained individual. He even admits on a number of occasions that Robin is in 
tune with forces in the human psyche that he is but dimly aware of, and is 
simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by her blatant sensuality. 
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In Freudian psychology the superego develops when the child toward the end 
of the phallic period begins to internalize the demands of the parents. Since the 
imagined expectations of the parents tend to be exaggerated, the superego, in an 
attempt to force the individual to live up to the "ego-ideal" derived from the 
parents, imposes rigid restrictions and demands which cannot ultimately be met. 
Felik's unremitting efforts to mold himself in terms of his idealized conception of 
his father suggests that the superego is clearly dominant in his personality. The 
exaggerated interest in societal forms is also commensurate with Felik's role in the 
novel in that one of the primary functions of the superego is to represent 
internalized cultural values. 
Jenny Petherbridge and Nora Flood are, like Felix, victimized by Robin's 
insatiable desire. Both are drawn inexorably to Robin, and yet each is unable to win 
anything like a lasting commitment from her. Viewed on the continuum of psychic 
experience Jenny is a superego type like Felix. She suffers "from some elaborate 
denial" (p. 65) and is incapable of deriving any real pleasure from the sexual act (p. 
68). The influence of the superego is not as great, however, in Nora's psyche. She 
feels, for example, no obligation to make moral judgments and no sense of being 
related to or defined by society (p. 53). Her vague sense that there is something 
wrong or reprehensible in Robin's behavior suggests that the superego is more 
active in her consciousness than it is in Robin's, and it is this which leads Nora to 
seek advice and counsel from Dr. Matthew O'Connor. 
Functioning like a Greek chorus made up of terribly astute analysts with a 
penchant for poetic statement, Dr. O'Connor comments upon the behavior of 
others with a precision that invokes both fright and awe. Intimately acquainted with 
the irrational and yet fully conscious of the dictates of society, O'Connor, like the 
Freudian ego, strives to establish equilibrium between the two warring factions. 
One of the fundamental differences between the ego and the id, says Freud, is that 
the ego has "a tendency to synthesize its contents, to bring together and unify its 
mental processes which is entirely absent from the id" (NL. p. 107). O'Connor, who 
comes "upon thinking with the eye that you fear, which is called the back of the 
head" (p. 83), incessantly attempts to "synthesize" or "unify" the various levels of 
mental functioning he sees in operation within himself and others. 
When Nora pays him a visit in his apartment, which has the appearance of a 
scene from the dream world which even the most healthy of us would tend to 
repress, she asks him to tell her everything he knows about the night (p. 79). What 
follows can easily be read as a rambling discourse on the nature of the life of the id. 
When Nora notes that something seems to happen to a person's identity when 
asleep, O'Connor says, "Let a man lay himself down in the Great Bed and his 
'identity' is no longer his own, his 'trust' is not with him, and his 'willingness' is 
turned over and of another permission. His distress is wild and anonymous" (p. 81). 
Since the id has "no organization and no unified will, only a compulsion to obtain 
satisfaction for the instinctual needs" (NL, p. 104), the concept of the "self" as a 
distinct entity imbued with the power to direct and control mental activity or 
behavior does not exist in the id. 
The power of the superego, says Freud, is greatly diminished in sleep, and so 
the opportunity to obtain satisfaction for instinctual needs in the fictive world of the 
dream is proportionately enhanced. When our beloved sleeps beside us is she not, 
O'Connor asks, "moving her legs aside for an unknown garrison? Or in a moment, 
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that takes but a second, murdering us with an ax? Eating our ear in a pie, pushing 
us aside with the back of her hand, sailing to some port with a ship full of sailors or 
medical men?" (p. 87). In response to Nora's request that he imagine what the 
experience of physical death would be like in sleep, he says: "But what of our 
death—permit us to reproach the night, wherein we die manifold alone" (p. 97). 
Death as we normally conceive it is the loss of self or identity, but if bodily processes 
cease when consciousness is operating on the level of the id there is, no matter how 
horrific it seems, no distinct, definable self or identity to be lost. 
The position of the ego is precarious, according to Freud, because it "is 
designed to represent the demands of the exernal world, but it also wishes to be a 
loyal servant to the id, to remain upon good terms with the id, to recommend itself 
to the id as object, and to draw the id's libido onto itself" (NL. p. 108). In his 
interaction with Nora, O'Connor is a loyal servant of the id in that he readily 
accedes to her incessant demand that he reveal his experience on that level of 
functioning, but he also strives to represent the external demands of the world by 
attempting to convince her that her requited love for Robin is self-destructive. 
Feeling defeated in his effort to make Nora appreciate the dangers involved in 
maintaining any ties with Robin, O'Connor begins to lose his own tenuous psychic 
balance. Freud asserted that when the ego is forced to recognize its weakness in the 
face of the passions of the id it breaks out into neurotic anxiety (NL p. 109-110). 
When O'Connor is last seen in the narrative, drunk and despondent in his favorite 
Parisian cafe, he is showing all the signs of neurotic anxiety (pp. 165-66). 
Much of the popular criticism of Freudian theory that has been published in 
recent years, like that of Norman O'Brown, Herbert Marcuse, and Philip Rieff, has 
taken issue with Freud's allegedly pessimistic conclusion in Civilization and Its 
Discontents that the dictates of society will inevitably frustrate the gratification of 
instinctual needs, and that man is, therefore, a creature divided against himself.4 
Although Nightwood is not written in the didactic mode, Barnes appears to have 
arrived at the same understanding of this very basic human dilemma. In the dream 
world of the novel Robin does have the opportunity to gratify her instinctual needs 
with minimal observance of the forms of society, and the consequences are clearly 
disastrous. All major characters are drawn irresistably to the level of experience 
which Robin represents, and each suffers some irremedial loss. After she divests 
herself of the demands of the superego, or that whole complex of forms and values 
known as "civilization," she simply returns to that state of being which our apish 
ancestors must have known before any of those forms and values evolved in the first 
place—she is intensely aware of and responsive to physical stimuli but has 
apparently lost all capacity to "think." She is an animal—pure and simple. 
Robert L. Nadeau 
George Mason University 
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A Note on Camus's "The Guest" 
Albert Camus's well-known work "The Guest" is a nearly perfect short story, 
which ranks with the best of Maupassant. It has been included in so many 
anthologies, both in French and in translations, that it is familiar to most college 
students today. For many readers, however, the end of the story remains an 
enigma. As a result of submitting this story to the most acid of all "laboratory" tests 
(i.e. the classroom), we have arrived at a conclusion that differs from that of most 
critics. 
"The Guest" centers on Daru's intention of granting self-determination to the 
Arab, of giving the latter the choice of going to Tinguit and to prison, or of going to 
the nomad region and to freedom. At this point, it will probably appear that the 
Arab is incapable of making a decision. Since, after all, he has not read the seven 
hundred plus pages of Sartre's Being and Nothingness, he is unaware of the 
existential implications of his action. The clue to the Arab's decision, however, is 
provided by Germaine Bree, who emphasizes the fraternal relationship between 
Daru and the Arab ("a dignity in their silence, a mutual respect in their attitude").' 
This dignity and this mutual respect, then, engender the sentiment that will furnish 
the ultimate solution of the story, but it is important to review the origin and the 
development of this fraternal relationship. 
It is Daru, and not the gendarme Balducci, who suggests that the Arab's hands 
be untied so that he might drink the mint tea. And it is again Daru who kneels in 
order to loosen the bonds of the squatting Arab, who "watched him with his 
feverish eyes."2 
Later, when they are alone, the Arab is drawn to Daru by his laconic speech in 
the same inexplicable manner that Marie, Celeste and others are attracted to 
Meursault. Readers of The Stranger will readily understand the following cryptic 
exchange of words. It begins with the Arab's query: "Why do you eat with me?" T o 
which Daru responds: "I'm hungry" (p. 99). The act of eating with "them" is, of 
course, one of the primary taboos of any racist. The Arab, then, immediately senses 
the absence of any racial prejudice on the part of Daru. 
Still later, before going to sleep, the Arab, without revealing any outward 
emotion, twice enjoins Daru to accompany him on the journey to prison the 
following day. (The Arab assumes that Balducci will conduct him to Tinguit.) His 
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